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POLICING BY NUMBERS: BIG DATA AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
Elizabeth E. Joh *
INTRODUCTION
The age of “big data” has come to policing. In Chicago, police
officers are paying particular attention to members of a “heat list”: those
identified by a risk analysis as most likely to be involved in future
violence. 1 In Charlotte, North Carolina, the police have compiled
foreclosure data to generate a map of high-risk areas that are likely to be
hit by crime. 2 In New York City, the N.Y.P.D. has partnered with
Microsoft to employ a “Domain Awareness System” that collects and
links information from sources like CCTVs, license plate readers,
radiation sensors, and informational databases. 3 In Santa Cruz,
California, the police have reported a dramatic reduction in burglaries
after relying upon computer algorithms that predict where new
burglaries are likely to occur. 4 The Department of Homeland Security
has applied computer analytics to Twitter feeds to find words like “pipe
bomb,” “plume,” and “listeria.” 5
*

Professor of Law, U.C. Davis School of Law (eejoh@ucdavis.edu). Thanks to David Ball, Jack
Chin, David Horton, Wayne Logan, Erin Murphy, and Charles Reichmann for comments and
suggestions, to the librarians of the Mabie Law Library for research assistance, to the staff of the
Washington Law Review for the invitation to contribute to the Examining Artificial Intelligence
symposium and for their editorial work, and to the U.C. Davis School of Law for institutional
support.
1. Jeremy Gorner, Chicago Police Use ‘Heat List’ as Strategy to Prevent Violence, CHI. TRIB.
(Aug. 21, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-08-21/news/ct-met-heat-list-20130821_1_
chicago-police-commander-andrew-papachristos-heat-list.
2. Michael Bess, Assessing the Impact of Home Foreclosures in Charlotte Neighborhoods,
GEOGRAPHY & PUB. SAFETY, Oct. 2008, at 2, 2.
3. Joe Coscarelli, The NYPD’s Domain Awareness System is Watching You, N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 9,
2012, 5:50 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2012/08/nypd-domain-awareness-systemmicrosoft-is-watching-you.html.
4. See Erica Goode, Sending the Police Before There’s a Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/us/16police.html.
5. Somini Sengupta, In Hot Pursuit of Numbers to Ward Off Crime, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2013,
10:48
PM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/in-hot-pursuit-of-numbers-to-ward-off-
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Big data has begun to transform government in fields as diverse as
public health, transportation management, and scientific research. 6 The
analysis of what were once unimaginable quantities of digitized data is
likely to introduce dramatic changes to a profession which, as late as
1900, involved little more than an able-bodied man who was given a
hickory club, a whistle, and a key to a call box. 7 Real-time access to and
analysis of vast quantities of information found in criminal records,
police databases, and surveillance data may alter policing 8 in the same
way that big data has revolutionized areas as diverse as presidential
elections, 9 internet commerce, 10 and language translation. 11 Some have
even heralded big data’s potential to change our assumptions about
social relationships, government, scientific study, and even knowledge
itself. 12
In the private sector, retailers have harnessed big data to produce
some seemingly trivial but surprising changes to their practices. 13 A
much discussed example stems from Target’s extensive use of data
analytics to identify certain purchases, such as supplements commonly
taken during pregnancy, to know whether a customer is pregnant,

crime/?_r=0.
6. See, e.g., TECHAMERICA FOUND., DEMYSTIFYING BIG DATA: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
TRANSFORMING THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT 12–15 (2012) (describing potential uses of big
data in healthcare, transportation, education, fraud detection, cyber security, and weather).
7. See Mark H. Haller, Historical Roots of Police Behavior: Chicago, 1890–1925, 10 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 303, 303 (1976).
8. Beth Pearsall, Predictive Policing: The Future of Law Enforcement?, NAT’L INST. JUST. J.,
June 2010, at 16, 16, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/230414.pdf (describing its
development as having “the potential to transform law enforcement”).
9. See Michael Scherer, Inside the Secret World of the Data Crunchers Who Helped Obama Win,
TIME (Nov. 7, 2012), http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/07/inside-the-secret-world-of-quants-anddata-crunchers-who-helped-obama-win/print/ (quoting one Obama campaign official as saying, “We
ran the election 66,000 times every night” in computer simulations).
10. See, e.g., VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION
THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 4–5 (2013) (describing development of
Farecast, which analyzes data from billions of flight price records to predict airline ticket price
variation).
11. See id. at 37–39 (describing language translation success of Google using trillion word data
set).
12. See, e.g., Adam Frank, Big Data Is the Steam Engine of Our Time, NPR (Mar. 12, 2013,
12:28 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/13.7/2013/03/12/174028759/big-data-is-the-steam-engine-ofour-time (“Big Data may be the steam engine of our time.”).
13. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=1
(“Almost
every major retailer, from grocery chains to investment banks to the U.S. Postal Service, has a
‘predictive analytics’ department . . . .”).
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without the woman disclosing the pregnancy herself. 14 For a retailer,
pregnancy is a prime opportunity to target a consumer when shopping
habits change and expand. An irate father allegedly complained to
Target that his daughter was unfairly targeted as a pregnant woman with
coupons only to discover, to his chagrin, that Target was better informed
than he was. 15 Similarly, Walmart, through its computerized retail
tracking, has discovered that Strawberry Pop-Tarts and beer sell as
briskly as flashlights when hurricanes are forecast. These products were
quickly shipped to Florida Walmart stores in the path of Hurricane
Frances in 2004. 16
Yet unlike the data crunching performed by Target, Walmart, or
Amazon, the introduction of big data to police work raises new and
significant challenges to the regulatory framework that governs
conventional policing. From one perspective, the Fourth Amendment has
proven remarkably flexible over time. Constitutional law has governed
ordinary policing whether the crimes involved bootlegging, 17 numbers
running, 18 marijuana farming, 19 or cell phones. 20 As the sophistication of
criminals has increased, so too have the tools of the police. In the
twentieth century, perhaps no two tools have been as revolutionary to
modern policing as the two way radio and the patrol car. 21
In this century, big data—in a variety of forms—may bring the next
dramatic change to police investigations. One researcher has concluded
that it will soon be technologically possible and affordable for

14. See id.
15. See id.
16. Constance L. Hays, What Wal-Mart Knows About Customers’ Habits, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14,
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/14/business/yourmoney/14wal.html.
17. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455–58, 465–66 (1928); see also Photo
Gallery, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/kenburns/prohibition/media_detail/2082733861-olmstead/ (last
visited Feb. 17, 2014) (noting that Roy Olmstead was nicknamed the “King of Puget Sound
Bootleggers”).
18. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348, 358–59 (1967) (illegal wagering).
19. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–33, 40 (2001).
20. In United States v. Jones, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), the Supreme Court held that the
government’s attachment of a GPS tracking device on the defendant’s car required a warrant. Id. at
954. On remand, the government argued that cell site data could be relied upon without a warrant,
which the district court permitted under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See
United States v. Jones, Crim. Action No. 05-0386 (ESH) (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2012), available at
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2005cr0386-658.
21. Cf. Samuel Walker, “Broken Windows” and Fractured History: The Use and Misuse of
History in Recent Police Patrol Analysis, 1 JUST. Q. 75, 80 (1984) (“The mid-century revolution in
American policing involved not just the patrol car but the car in conjunction with the telephone and
the two-way radio.”).
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government to record everything anyone says or does. 22 How well will
the Fourth Amendment’s rules pertaining to unreasonable searches and
seizures adapt to the uses of big data? Scholars have widely discussed
the shortcomings of applying Fourth Amendment doctrines, once
adequate for a world of electronic beepers, physical wiretaps, and
binocular surveillance, to rapidly changing technologies. 23 But big data
may magnify these concerns considerably.
This article identifies three uses of big data that hint at the future of
policing and the questions these tools raise about conventional Fourth
Amendment analysis. Two of these examples, predictive policing and
mass surveillance systems, have already been adopted by a small
number of police departments around the country. A third example—the
potential use of DNA databank samples—presents an untapped source of
big data analysis. Whether any of these three examples of big data
policing attract more widespread adoption by the police is yet unknown,
but it likely that the prospect of being able to analyze large amounts of
information quickly and cheaply will prove to be attractive. While
seemingly quite distinct, these three uses of big data suggest the need to
draw new Fourth Amendment lines now that the government has the
capability and desire to collect and manipulate large amounts of
digitized information.
I.

THE RISE OF BIG DATA

What is big data? While not everyone agrees on a single definition of
big data, most agree that the term refers to: (1) the application of
artificial intelligence (2) to the vast amount of digitized data now
available. 24 From this basic definition, a few observations emerge about
22. JOHN VILLASENOR, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, RECORDING EVERYTHING: DIGITAL STORAGE AS
ENABLER OF AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENTS 1 (Dec. 14, 2011), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/12/14%20digital%20storage%20villa
senor/1214_digital_storage_villasenor.pdf.
23. A large literature has developed that critiques the limitations of modern search and seizure
law as applied to computer software and hardware, the internet, new surveillance technologies, etc.
See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 803 n.7 (2004) (collecting sources espousing this
view); Dan Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1083, 1086–87 (2002) (arguing that the current view on Fourth Amendment privacy “is not
responsive to life in the modern Information Age”).
24. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, How Big Data Became So Big, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/business/how-big-data-became-so-big-unboxed.html?smid=plshare (“Big Data is a shorthand label that typically means applying the tools of artificial
intelligence, like machine learning, to vast new troves of data beyond that captured in standard
databases.”).
AN
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what is distinct and significant about big data. 25
First, big data alerts us to the sheer amount of information that is
being produced rapidly every year in digital form. 26 The turn towards
digitized information has been rapid and dramatic. As recently as the
year 2000, only a quarter of the world’s stored information was digital;
the majority of it was on film, paper, magnetic tapes, and other similar
non-digital media. 27 Today, the opposite is true; nearly all of the world’s
stored information is digital: about 2.7 zettabytes in 2012. 28
Digital information continues to grow at a rapid pace. According to
IBM, ninety percent of the world’s data has been generated in the past
two years. 29 The Executive Chairman of Google has claimed that we
now create as much information in two days as we did from the
beginning of human civilization to 2003. 30 Some have suggested that we
may run out of ways to quantify numerically the amount of data
generated. 31
Nearly every piece of information today is capable of digitization and
storage, including Internet searches, retail purchases, Facebook posts,
cellphone calls, highway toll usage, and every last word in books. 32
Cheap, small, and sophisticated sensors and tracking devices have been
built into every sort of product and object: smartphones, cars, toll

25. Here, too, there are some who dispute whether big data is a new phenomenon at all. See, e.g.,
Samuel Arbesman, Five Myths About Big Data, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-big-data/2013/08/15/64a0dd0a-e04411e2-963a-72d740e88c12_story.html (arguing that “big data has been around for a long time”).
26. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 10, at 8–11 (describing vast quantities of
digitized data available today).
27. See Kenneth Neil Cukier & Viktor Mayer-Schöenberger, The Rise of Big Data: How It’s
Changing the Way We Think About the World, FOREIGN AFF., May–June 2013, at 28, 28.
28. Albert Pimental, Big Data: The Hidden Opportunity, FORBES (May 1, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/05/01/big-data-the-hidden-opportunity/. One zettabyte
is 10 to the power of 21 bytes. This is equivalent to the amount of data which could fill 250 billion
DVDs. Melody Kramer, The NSA Data: Where Does It Go?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (June 12, 2013),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/06/130612-nsa-utah-data-center-storage-zettabytesnowden/.
29. IBM, IBM BIG DATA SUCCESS STORIES 1 (2011), available at http://public.dhe.ibm.com/
software/data/sw-library/big-data/ibm-big-data-success.pdf.
30. Google, Eric Schmidt at Technomy, YOUTUBE (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=UAcCIsrAq70.
31. The largest current recognized number is a yottabye: a digit with twenty-four zeros. See
Charles Walford, Information Overload: There Is So Much Data Stored in the World That We May
Run Out of Ways to Quantify It, DAILY MAIL (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
sciencetech/article-2247081/There-soon-words-data-stored-world.html.
32. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 10, at 83–97 (discussing the “datafication
of everything”).
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transponders, library books, and internet use. 33 The city of Santander,
Spain is a prototype of the coming “smart city,” with 12,000 sensors
buried underground that measure everything from air pollution to free
parking spaces. 34 The resulting data doesn’t disappear; it ends up in
“data barns” that store the ever-growing amount of information. 35 WalMart handles more than a million customer transactions every hour,
resulting in databases storing more than 2.5 petabytes of information. 36
In 2008, Facebook boasted storage of 40 billion photos. 37 The Library of
Congress decided in 2010 to archive every public “tweet” generated on
Twitter: about 170 billion tweets (and counting) in January 2013. 38
Second, because the term also refers to the artificial intelligence
applied to these huge data sets, the big data phenomenon also suggests a
change in the way we understand our world. If conventional scientific
research begins with a hypothesis or question that then shapes the
collection of the relevant data, the big data phenomenon turns such
conventions upside down. Because data is being collected and stored all
of the time, research questions do not have to shape or limit data
collection at all. 39 Researchers need not limit themselves to data
sampling, either. Big data permits the study of a phenomenon where the
set is nearly everything that is possible to study (another way of stating

33. UPS, for example uses telematics sensors in more than 46,000 vehicles; these tell the
company about the speed, direction, braking, and drive train performance of their trucks. See What
is Big Data?, SAS, http://www.sas.com/big-data/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
34. Lauren Frayer, High-Tech Sensors Help Old Port City Leap Into Smart Future, NPR (June 4,
2013, 3:27 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2013/06/04/188370672/Sensors-TransformOld-Spanish-Port-Into-New-Smart-City.
35. Indeed, a series of investigative reports by the New York Times has revealed the relatively
little-known environmental costs of huge data centers. See, e.g., James Glanz, Power, Pollution and
the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/23/technology/datacenters-waste-vast-amounts-of-energy-belying-industry-image.html (quoting an industry executive
as describing an “industry dirty secret”); James Glanz, Data Barns in a Farm Town, Gobbling
Power and Flexing Muscle, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/24/
technology/data-centers-in-rural-washington-state-gobble-power.html?ref=us
(reporting
on
“sprawling and ubiquitous” “data barns”).
36. See SAS, BIG DATA MEETS BIG DATA ANALYTICS 1 (2012), available at http://www.sas.com
/resources/whitepaper/wp_46345.pdf.
37. See Doug Beaver, 10 Billion Photos, FACEBOOK (Oct. 14, 2008, 6:03 PM),
http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=30695603919.
38. Erin Allen, Update on the Twitter Archive at the Library of Congress, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
BLOG (Jan. 4, 2013), http://blogs.loc.gov/loc/2013/01/update-on-the-twitter-archive-at-the-libraryof-congress/.
39. Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier discuss how the combination of cheap and easy data storage
with powerful analytic technology makes it possible to constantly store data for purposes that may
not be immediately apparent. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 10, at 98–106.
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that we are approaching n=all). 40 The existence of these massive data
sets permits sifting and resifting of the information therein for multiple
purposes. 41 Thus, the Library of Congress’s continuous collection of
“tweets” has interested researchers with questions as diverse as the role
of public responses to smoking ads, changes in investor sentiments, and
real-time hurricane analysis. 42
Such massive quantities of information also suggest that the very
kinds of questions posed by researchers will be different in the big data
context. With so much data available, Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and
Kenneth Cukier argue that two conventions of traditional research—a
working hypothesis and the search for causality—are no longer
necessary given the insights that can be derived from correlations found
in big data. 43 The existence of huge amounts of data permits research
into correlations that don’t require an underlying hypothesis. For
instance, Google’s mathematical models have identified the forty-five
search terms (e.g. “medicine for cough and fever”) most strongly
identified with historical flu data. 44 The resulting Google Flu Trends has
proven to be remarkably accurate in matching the historical surveillance
data collected by the Centers for Disease Control.45 Thus, we can predict
new outbreaks of the flu simply by identifying correlations between
Google search terms and the spread of seasonal flu. 46 These predictions
40. See id. at 26 (“In many areas . . . a shift is taking place from collecting some data to gathering
as much as possible, and if feasible, getting everything: N = all.”).
41. See id. at 122 (“The crux of data’s worth is its seemingly unlimited potential for reuse: its
option value.”).
42. Victor Luckerson, What the Library of Congress Plans to Do with All Your Tweets, TIME
(Feb. 25, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/02/25/what-the-library-of-congress-plans-to-do-with
-all-your-tweets/.
43. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 10, at 61 (“In a small-data world, because
so little data tended to be available, both causal investigations and correlation analysis began with a
hypothesis, which was then tested to be either falsified or verified. . . . Today, with so much data
around and more to come, such hypotheses are no longer crucial for correlational analysis.”).
44. See id. at 2.
45. See id.; see also Miguel Helft, Google Uses Searches to Track Flu’s Spread, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 11, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/12/technology/internet/12flu.html (reporting that
Google found “a strong correlation” between five years of its data and the C.D.C.’s reports of flu).
46. Explore Flu Trends—United States, GOOGLE.ORG, http://www.google.org/flutrends/us/#US
(last visited Feb. 17, 2014). Google has done the same with dengue trends around the world.
Dengue Trends Around the World, GOOGLE.ORG, http://www.google.org/denguetrends/intl/en_us/
(last visited Feb. 17, 2014). The same approach has been taken with information generated by
Twitter. See ADAM SADILEK ET AL., ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE,
MODELING SPREAD OF DISEASE FROM SOCIAL INTERACTIONS (2012), available at http://
www.cs.rochester.edu/~sadilek/publications/Sadilek-Kautz-Silenzio_Modeling-Spread-of-Diseasefrom-Social-Interactions_ICWSM-12.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2014). Such big data analysis is not
perfect, however. Google’s algorithms were grossly inaccurate in winter of 2012–13 and predicted
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are useful in their predictive value even though they provide no causal
explanation, much in the same way that Amazon’s algorithms can
predict that you might like a product based on its analysis without caring
why. 47 A key contribution of big data is the ability to find useful
correlations within data sets not capable of analysis by ordinary human
assessment.
II.

USE OF BIG DATA IN POLICING

Across the country, some police departments have taken notice that
they stand to benefit from big data. While the use of big data in the
private sector has raised concerns about consumer privacy, its use by the
police raises even bigger questions about the limits of using data to
justify surveillance, investigation, and detention by the police. This
section discusses three of the most important developments in use of big
data by the police: crime prediction, mass surveillance, and DNA
databanks.
A.

Crime Prediction: Predictive Policing

Perhaps the most visible use of big data by police departments thus
far has been predictive policing: the application of computer modeling to
historical crime data to predict future criminal activity. 48 While the
police have long tried to find patterns of criminal activity on which to
focus their resources, 49 predictive policing permits the police to harness
thousands of data points to forecast where crime is likely to happen. The
most basic models rely on past crimes, but data sources can include
factors as variable as payday schedules, seasonal variation, liquor store

far more cases than the CDC counted. Part of the problem may be that the flu gained widespread
media attention in 2012, which then increased the use of the same search terms that had better
predictive value before. See Nick Bilton, Disruption, Data Without Context Tells a Misleading
Story, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2013), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/disruptions-google-flutrends-shows-problems-of-big-data-without-context/; Declan Butler, When Google Got Flu Wrong,
494 NATURE 155, 155–56 (2013), available at http://www.nature.com/news/when-google-got-fluwrong-1.12413.
47. Cf. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 10, at 59 (“The correlations show what, not
why, but . . . knowing what is often good enough.”) (emphasis in original).
48. See JENNIFER BACHNER, PREDICTIVE POLICING: PREVENTING CRIME WITH DATA AND
ANALYTICS 14 (2013), available at http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/
Predictive%20Policing.pdf (“The fundamental notion underlying the theory and practice of
predictive policing is that we can make probabilistic inferences about future criminal activity based
on existing data.”).
49. See id. at 7 (observing that “quantitative crime analysis spans centuries”).
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locations, and potential escape routes. 50
What is new about predictive policing is not the use of quantitative
data. 51 In the 1990s, the N.Y.P.D. ushered in an era of intelligence-based
policing. 52 Under Commissioner Bill Bratton, the N.Y.P.D. introduced
the now famous CompStat system 53: weekly meetings at the N.Y.P.D.
headquarters at which a revolving group of commanding officers around
the city gave accountings of themselves for the recent crime data
collected in their precinct. 54 By evaluating performance by the rise or
fall of crime data within their precincts, CompStat meetings forced
accountability upon commanding officers. Such data-driven policing
spread to other departments around the United States when crime rates
began to fall dramatically within New York City, 55 a result the police
attributed to its reliance upon CompStat, along with the adoption of
“broken windows” policing 56 and aggressive stop and frisk tactics. 57

50. See id. at 16.
51. See WALTER L. PERRY ET AL., PREDICTIVE POLICING: THE ROLE OF CRIME FORECASTING IN
LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 2 (2013) (“The use of statistical and geospatial analyses to
forecast crime levels has been around for decades.”); Pearsall, supra note 8, at 18 (citing one police
chief’s skepticism that predictive policing is a break from older trends in intelligence based
policing).
52. See BACHNER, supra note 48, at 6, 9 (noting that “predictive policing is viewed as one pillar
of intelligence-led policing”).
53. Bratton himself chronicled his tenure as Commissioner in his memoir The Turnaround. See
WILLIAM BRATTON WITH PETER KNOBLER, THE TURNAROUND: HOW AMERICA’S TOP COP
REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC (1998).
54. There are numerous accounts of the perceived innovation and success of the N.Y.P.D. during
the 1990s. See, e.g., VINCENT E. HENRY, THE COMPSTAT PARADIGM: MANAGEMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY IN POLICING, BUSINESS AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR 17–18 (2003) (describing
CompStat meetings as “intensive monthly performance evaluations for every commander of
practically every operational unit in the agency”); ELI B. SILVERMAN, NYPD BATTLES CRIME:
INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES IN POLICING 97–124 (1999) (describing development of CompStat
meetings). In fact, some credit Bratton for thinking of a predictive policing model. See PERRY ET
AL., supra note 51, at 4.
55. See BACHNER, supra note 48, at 9 (noting CompStat “has been adopted by nearly every law
enforcement agency in the country”).
56. “Broken windows” policing generally refers to a style of policing that focuses on minor
offense enforcement on the assumption that such signs of disorder, if left unchecked, will lead to
more serious crimes. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/.
57. More recently, however, the credit given to the use of CompStat by the N.Y.P.D. has been
criticized. See, e.g., David F. Greenberg, Studying New York City’s Crime Decline: Methodological
Issues, 31 JUST. Q. 154, 182 (2013) (concluding that there is an “absence of evidence pointing to
large crime prevention effects in New York from [tactics including] CompStat . . . .”). And the stop
and frisk policies of the N.Y.P.D. were eventually held to be unconstitutional. See Floyd v. City of
New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046209 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013).
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CompStat and similar programs inspired by it rely on the collection of
crime statistics to inform police decision-making. 58
The innovation of predictive policing is the application of artificial
intelligence to such large data sets. CompStat relied heavily on the
collection and display of past crime data; predictive policing applies
computer analysis to similar information. The identification of future
geographic places likely to be targeted by criminals has attracted the
most attention. These predictive models all rely on well-established
observations about the spatial distribution of criminal behavior. Crime is
not found randomly across a city, but rather tends to fall within limited,
and often very small, areas. 59 (Crime tends to be “lumpy.”) For instance,
researchers found that over a fourteen year period, about fifty percent of
the crime in Seattle was limited to 4.5 percent of the city’s street
segments. 60 Based upon this connection between crime and place,
computer models adopt different approaches towards the prediction of
crime.
For instance, the Santa Cruz Police Department uses software that
assumes that crime patterns follow a pattern similar to earthquake
aftershocks. 61 The software applies a computer algorithm to a database
representing five years’ worth of crime data (including crime time,
location, and type) to assess the likelihood of future crime occurring in
the geographic areas within the city, narrowed to squares measured 500
by 500 feet (Figure A). 62 Prior to each shift, Santa Cruz police officers

58. Of course, even knowing about these high crime areas might suggest future criminal activity
taking place in the same place, but the identification of these areas does not involve prediction
specifically. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62
EMORY L.J. 259, 274 (2012).
59. See, e.g., PERRY ET AL., supra note 51, at 2 (“[C]riminals tend to operate in their comfort
zone. That is, they tend to commit the type of crimes that they have committed successfully in the
past, generally close to the same time and location.”).
60. Anthony A. Braga et al., The Relevance of Micro Places to Citywide Robbery Trends: A
Longitudinal Analysis of Robbery Incidents at Street Corners and Block Faces in Boston, 48 J. RES.
CRIME & DELINQ. 7, 10 (2011) (citing David L. Weisburd et al., Trajectories of Crime at Places: A
Longitudinal Study of Street Segments in the City of Seattle, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 283 (2004)).
61. See, e.g., Martin Kaste, Can Software That Predicts Crime Pass Constitutional Muster?, NPR
(July 26, 2013, 4:55 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/07/26/205835674/can-software-that-predictscrime-pass-constitutional-muster (noting that the software creator “wanted to see if computers could
model future crime the same way they model earthquake aftershocks. Turns out they can.”). The
software, designed by mathematicians and social scientists at UCLA, Santa Clara University, and
U.C. Irvine, is called PredPol and is marketed to police departments. See Policing Meets Big Data,
PREDPOL, http://www.predpol.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
62. See Zach Friend, Predictive Policing: Using Technology to Reduce Crime, FBI LAW
ENFORCEMENT BULL. (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/lawenforcement-bulletin/2013/April/predictive-policing-using-technology-to-reduce-crime.

07 - Joh Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2014]

3/26/2014 2:48 PM

POLICING BY NUMBERS

45

receive information identifying 15 such squares with the highest
probability of crime, and are encouraged—though not required—to
provide greater attention to these areas. 63 After its experimental
introduction in 2011, the Santa Cruz Police Department reported a
significant drop in burglaries when compared to a period prior to the
adoption of predictive policing. 64 Similar experiments relying upon this
software are being conducted by the police in Los Angeles and Seattle. 65

Figure A: Predictive Policing Map 66
Other approaches may consider additional factors other than the
timing and location of past crimes. Risk terrain theory, for example,
looks at the social, physical, and behavioral factors that make it more
likely certain areas will be targeted by crime. 67 The resulting risk terrain
63. See BACHNER, supra note 48, at 25.
64. See id. at 26. At least one investigative article has raised doubts, however, as to whether
PredPol actually delivers on its claims about reducing crime. See Darwin Bond-Graham & Ali
Winston, All Tomorrow’s Crimes: The Future of Policing Looks a Lot Like Good Branding, S.F.
WEEKLY (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.sfweekly.com/2013-10-30/news/predpol-sfpd-predictivepolicing-compstat-lapd/full/ (suggesting that PredPol’s creators have been “most successful [with]
its marketing algorithms”).
65. See, e.g., David Talbot, L.A. Cops Embrace Crime-Predicting Algorithm, MIT TECH. REV.
(July 2, 2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/428354/la-cops-embrace-crime-predictingalgorithm/ (describing successful use of Predpol software in Foothill precinct of Los Angeles);
Sengupta, supra note 5 (describing Seattle Police Department’s use of PredPol software for property
crimes).
66. Looking Ahead, Not in the Rear View Mirror, PREDPOL, http://www.predpol.com/technology/
(last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
67. See, e.g., Leslie W. Kennedy et al., Risk Clusters, Hotspots, and Spatial Intelligence: Risk
Terrain Modeling as an Algorithm for Police Resource Allocations, 27 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 339, 342–43 (2011).
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map, which gives each factor its own mapping “layer,” is a composite
map that assigns a risk assessment for all of the factors associated with
criminal activity. 68 For example, police in Morris County, New Jersey,
use five factors for their risk terrain modeling: (1) past burglaries; (2) the
residential location of individuals recently arrested for property crimes;
(3) the proximity to major highways; (4) the geographic concentration of
young men; and (5) the location of apartment complexes and hotels. 69
Morris County police attribute significant drops in violent and property
crime to a reliance on risk terrain modeling. 70
A second type of predictive technology focuses on the application of
algorithms to social media in order to identify likely criminality based
on the role an individual plays within a social network. 71 This social
network analysis 72 begins with the assumption that social networks
undergird many crimes: an illegal drug-dealing network may loosely
follow the hierarchical structure of a legitimate business, with suppliers,
distributors, buyers, and financiers. 73 (Indeed, this type of analysis has
its roots in the military study of insurgent groups abroad. 74) The
algorithms used in social network software can help police visualize the
density of connections an individual has within a social network. These
connections might take the form of exchanges, communications, family
ties, participation in crimes, or affiliations with an organization. 75

68. See id. at 343.
69. Jeffrey S. Paul & Thomas M. Joiner, Integration of Centralized Intelligence with Geographic
Information Systems: A Countywide Initiative, GEOGRAPHY & PUB. SAFETY, Oct. 2011, at 5, 7.
70. See id. at 7 (noting that since 2007, when the county created an intelligence crime task force,
“the total crime index in the county has decreased by 11%, violent crime by 21%, and property
crime by 7%”).
71. IBM offers, for instance, a social media analytics tool that police departments can use to
monitor Facebook and Twitter activity. See Somini Sengupta, Privacy Fears Grow as Cities
Increase Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/
technology/privacy-fears-as-surveillance-grows-in-cities.html.
72. Social network analysis should not be confused with police surveillance and infiltration of
social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter, which have also proven to be valuable
investigative tools.
73. See BACHNER, supra note 48, at 22–23.
74. See Philip Ball, Unmasking Organised Crime Networks with Data, BBC (July 9, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20130709-unmask-crime-networks-with-data/1.
75. See BACHNER, supra note 48, at 23.
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Figure B: Hypothetical Social Network Analysis 76
When used by a police department, social network analysis might be
used to identify a “central node”: a person with a high degree of
“connectivity within the network” (Figure B).77 While traditional police
work might easily identify leaders within a criminal organization, social
network analysis can identify those with influence or those who transmit
information within the group quickly and yet whose roles are not
otherwise apparent. 78 The software can even reveal deliberately
concealed affiliations. Even if an individual suspected of being part of a
criminal organization does not admit his affiliation, social network
software can calculate the probability of his membership. 79
How does such software help police investigations? The identification
of a highly “networked” individual could permit the police to infiltrate
an organization in the most efficient way, or to identify a hidden source
of influence within an organization for further investigation. 80 Also, by
revealing hidden relationships among groups, police can disrupt
subterfuges by rival criminal organizations. In a gang war, one group
likely to retaliate may not do so directly, for fear of being targeted by the

76. Aaron Lester, Police Clicking into Crimes Using New Software, BOSTON GLOBE (Mar. 18,
2013),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/03/17/police-intelligence-one-click-away/
DzzDbrwdiNkjNMA1159ybM/”story.html (describing provisional use of new Nucleik software
within Springfield, Massachusetts gang unit).
77. See BACHNER, supra note 48, at 23.
78. See Lester, supra note 76.
79. See Ball, supra note 74.
80. See BACHNER, supra note 48, at 22–24.
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police, and instead may enlist an ally gang. 81 Social network analysis
can help understand which alliances might require heightened
surveillance. 82
B.

Mass Surveillance: Domain Awareness Systems

If predictive policing harnesses data to predict the future, computer
surveillance systems help police create a software-enhanced picture of
the present, using thousands of data points from multiple sources within
a city. As with predictive policing, computer enhanced mass surveillance
grows out of other policing techniques. 83 While surveillance has long
been an essential tool of the police, what has changed is its supporting
technology. Sophisticated yet inexpensive, the surveillance equipment
used by the police today produces enormous amounts of information,
often too much for the police to use in an efficient way without the help
of technology. The N.Y.P.D., for instance, has a database of 16 million
license plates captured from its license plate readers, along with the
locations of where the plates were photographed. 84
The N.Y.P.D. has responded to this big data problem by creating a
software program with Microsoft. Dubbed a “domain awareness system”
(“DAS”), 85 the software collects and analyzes information around the
clock within New York City from sources as disparate as the city’s
3,000 public surveillance cameras,86 over 200 automatic license plate
readers, 87 more than 2,000 radiation sensors, 88 and information from

81. See generally id.
82. See Ball, supra note 74.
83. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3
(2008) (“Government’s increasing use of surveillance and data mining is a predictable result of
accelerating developments in information technology.”).
84. Joseph Goldstein, Weekly Police Briefing Offers Snapshot of Department and Its Leader,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/11/nyregion/weekly-briefingprovides-lengthy-snapshot-of-kelly-and-nypd.html.
85. Matt Sledge, NYPD License Plate Readers Will Be Able to Track Every Car Entering
Manhattan, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 13, 2013, 5:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/03/13/nypd-license-plate-readers_n_2869627.html.
86. Cara Buckley, New York Plans Surveillance Veil for Downtown, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/09/nyregion/09ring.html; Mark Duell, The Extraordinary ‘Ring of
Steel’ Around Ground Zero: NYPD Steps Up Dirty Bomb Threat Protection with $200M Project,
DAILY MAIL (July 29, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2020266/NYPD-steps-dirtybomb-radiation-threat-protection-200m-Manhattan-project.html.
87. Al Baker, Camera Scans of Car Plates Are Reshaping Police Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/nyregion/12plates.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
(observing that in 2011, the N.Y.P.D. had 238 license plate readers, 130 of them mobile). In March
2013, Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly announced plans to install license plate readers in every
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police databases. 89 The software’s mapping features permit the police to
see and understand the information in a way that was not possible
before. Located within the N.Y.P.D.’s lower Manhattan Security
Initiative Command Center, the Domain Awareness System’s operators
can quickly use the software to identify potential threats. 90
This system gives the police real-time access to information that can
reveal connections between persons, items, and places in ways that may
not be obvious to individual crime analysts. The DAS employs video
analytic software designed to detect threats, such as unattended bags. 91
The N.Y.P.D. claims that the DAS can track where a car associated with
a suspect is located, and where it has been in the past days, weeks, or
months. 92 The DAS can also check license plate numbers, compare them
to watch lists, and provide the police with immediate access to any
criminal history associated with the car owner.93 In November 2013, the
N.Y.P.D. relied on its DAS to watch nearly every portion of the New
York City Marathon route, a potential terrorist target after the Boston
Marathon bombings in April 2013. 94
While New York City has received the most attention for its high-tech
approach to surveillance, other cities have shown interest in these mass
surveillance systems. Oakland, California, a much smaller city in
lane of traffic that serve as exists and entrances to Manhattan, all of which would be linked to the
domain awareness system. See Sledge, supra note 85.
88. Two thousand belt-mounted mobile radiation detectors are carried by N.Y.P.D. officers. See
Duell, supra note 86. The N.Y.P.D. also plans to use very sensitive radiation scanners to detect the
presence of concealed weapons on individuals in high crime areas. See Slate V Staff, NYPD Plans
Public Radiation Scanners to Detect Guns, SLATE (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
trending/2013/01/24/nypd_radiation_scanners_gun_detectors_to_be_set_up_in_public_spaces.html.
89. See Sledge, supra note 85.
90. Duell, supra note 86.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Press Release, Mayor Bloomberg, Police Commissioner Kelly and Microsoft Unveil
New, State-of-the-Art Law Enforcement Technology That Aggregates and Analyzes Existing Public
Safety Data in Real Time to Provide a Comprehensive View of Potential Threats and Criminal
Activity
(Aug.
8,
2012),
available
at
http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/
menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2f1c701c789a0/index.jsp?pageID=mayor_press_release&catID=11
94&doc_name=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom%2Fhtml%2F2012b%2Fpr29112.html&cc=unused1978&rc=1194&ndi=1.
93. Rocco Paranscandola & Tina Moore, NYPD Unveils New $40 Million Super Computer
System that Uses Data from Network of Cameras, License Plate Readers and Crime Reports, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Aug. 8, 2012, 8:50 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-unveils-new40-million-super-computer-system-data-network-cameras-license-plate-readers-crime-reportsarticle-1.1132135.
94. See Michael Schwirtz, After Boston Bombings, New York Police Plan Tight Security at
Marathon, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/02/sports/videosurveillance-to-be-a-key-component-of-marathon-security.html?_r=0.
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comparison but plagued with a high crime rate,95 has decided to launch a
Domain Awareness Center 96 poised to collect and analyze surveillance
data “from gunshot-detection sensors in the barrios of East Oakland to
license plate readers mounted on police cars patrolling the city’s upscale
hills.” 97 The resulting analysis will be displayed on a bank of giant
monitors providing Oakland police with a unified visual representation
of the very different sources: police and fire dispatch systems, gunshot
detectors, license plate readers, private alarm detection programs, and
social media feeds. 98
C.

Genetic Big Data: DNA Databanks

Perhaps less obvious but no less important a big data matter is the
collection of DNA for criminal justice databases, which as of June 2013
contained DNA profiles for 10.7 million offenders and 1.7 million
arrestees. 99 The United States has used this information to amass the
largest DNA database in the world. 100 Police agencies around the
country rely on CODIS—the shorthand for the system that links
information among the different DNA databases around the country 101—
95. Forbes named Oakland the third most dangerous city in America in 2012 with a population
between 100,000 and 499,000. See The 10 Most Dangerous U.S. Cities, FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/pictures/mlj45jggj/3-oakland/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2014) (stating that
Oakland’s violent crime rate is “1,683 per 100,000 residents”).
96. The project was initially sought by the Port of Oakland, but expanded to include the city of
Oakland itself. See Steven Tavares, Big Brother in Oakland? There Might Be an App Coming For
That, EBCITIZEN (July 10, 2013), http://www.ebcitizen.com/2013/07/big-brother-in-oakland-theremight-be.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+
EastbaycitizenBreakingNewsPoliticsLife+%28EastBayCitizen+%7C+Breaking+News+Politics+
Life%29.
97. Sengupta, supra note 71.
98. Ali Winston, Oakland Surveillance Center Raises Concerns, SFGATE (July 17, 2013, 9:46
PM),
http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Oakland-surveillance-center-raises-concerns4671708.php. In February 2014, however, Oakland officials delayed voting on a contract to build its
DAS after local residents raised concerns about privacy. See Associated Press, Oakland Delays Vote
on Surveillance System, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2014/feb/19/oakland-delays-vote-on-surveillance-system/.
99. See CODIS—NDIS Statistics, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/
ndis-statistics (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
100. See Solomon Moore, F.B.I. and States Vastly Expand DNA Databases, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/19/us/19DNA.html (noting that CODIS is “the largest
[database] in the world”). The U.K., however, has the distinction of having the largest portion of its
population—about ten percent—in its DNA database. See, e.g., Jill Lawless, Spread of DNA
Databases Sparks Ethical Concerns, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 12, 2013, 8:50 AM),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/spread-dna-databases-sparks-ethical-concerns.
101. Although CODIS specifically refers to the software that links DNA databases around the
country for information sharing purposes, it is also used generically as a term to describe the
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to match crime scene samples with offender or arrestee DNA profiles.102
The millions of DNA samples now accessible by the police present
another potential use of big data.
The rapid growth of American DNA databases can be attributed to the
ever-expanding categories of those deemed eligible for compulsory
DNA collection. While the first state DNA databases collected samples
only from violent felons or felony sex offenders, today every state
collects DNA from all convicted felons. 103 A majority of states collect
DNA from those convicted of misdemeanor sex offenses. 104 In 2012,
New York became the first “all crimes state.” 105 Nearly every person
convicted of a crime in New York, regardless of its gravity, will be
required to submit a DNA sample for inclusion in the state’s DNA
database. 106
The reliance of states upon arrestee DNA collection appears to be
following a similar path. In 1997, Louisiana became the first state to
authorize the collection of DNA from some categories of arrestees. 107
Today, twenty-eight more states and the federal government have
followed Louisiana’s lead in requiring some categories of arrestees to
provide DNA samples. 108 The Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in
American DNA database system more generally. See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the
CODIS Program and the National DNA Index System, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
102. See, e.g., id. (describing how CODIS would be used in a hypothetical sexual assault case).
CODIS permits states and the federal government to upload and compare DNA profiles on the
National DNA Index System (NDIS). See id. While state laws specify the types of profiles that can
be included in state databases, federal law determines which DNA profiles can be stored and shared
at the national level. See 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a) (2006). Many resources provide helpful explanatory
information on DNA and how it is used in criminal investigations. E.g., SHELDON KRIMSKY &
TANIA SIMONCELLI, GENETIC JUSTICE: DNA DATA BANKS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES 3–27 (2010); DNA Evidence Basics, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Aug. 9, 2012),
http://www.nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/dna/basics/pages/welcome.aspx.
103. See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41800, DNA TESTING IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: BACKGROUND, CURRENT LAW, GRANTS, AND ISSUES 7 (2012).
104. See id.
105. New York DNA Database: Governor Cuomo Signs ‘All Crimes’ DNA Testing Into Law,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 3, 2012, 10:22 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/20/newyork-dna-database-governor-cuomo-all-crimes-dna-testing_n_1366624.html.
106. See id. (noting minor exemption “for those convicted of possession of a small amount of
marijuana as long as they have no prior convictions”).
107. See Julie Samuels et al., Collecting DNA From Arrestees: Implementation Lessons, NAT’L
INST. JUST. J., June 2012, at 18, 19, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/238484.pdf.
108. See DNA Arrestee Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
research/civil-and-criminal-justice/dna-arrestee-laws.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2014) (reporting that
in May 2013, Nevada became the most recent state to require DNA samples from all felony
arrestees).
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Maryland v. King 109 upholding compulsory arrestee DNA collection 110
will likely mean that the practice will expand to many other states.111
How do DNA databases raise big data questions? First, the emerging
and controversial use of familial matches is in fact a big data issue.
Based on the assumption that close relatives share more genetic
information than unrelated individuals, familial searches are searches of
DNA databases that look for profiles that only partially match the
thirteen STR markers 112 on a DNA profile. 113 (Such a search might take
place, for instance, if a CODIS search yields no identical match. 114)
Familial searches take advantage of the big data set that is CODIS: the
capability to search millions of individual DNA profiles.115Additional
testing on DNA samples may be necessary to confirm potential
matches. 116
Similar to other uses of big data, a familial search repurposes
(genetic) data collected for another reason (identical matches).117 Critics
of familial searches have focused on issues of privacy and equity,
including the concern that familial searches will draw disproportionate

109. __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
110. Id. at 1980.
111. The Katie Sepich Enhanced DNA Collection Act provides federal funding for those states
that wish to establish arrestee DNA collection programs. See Katie Sepich Enhanced DNA
Collection Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-253, § 3, 126 Stat. 2407 (2013). For further commentary on
the decision, see Elizabeth E. Joh, Maryland v. King: Policing and Genetic Privacy, 11 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 281 (2013).
112. The thirteen STR markers refer to the thirteen places on the human chromosome where there
is high variability. These identification markers provide law enforcement with a unique identifier
for everyone who provides a DNA sample. See The FBI and DNA, FBI (Nov. 28, 2011),
http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/november/dna_112811.
113. See, e.g., Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 291, 297–300 (2010) (describing mechanics of familial searches). How those genetically
related to the sought after offender turn up depends on a number of factors, including whether a
jurisdiction intentionally searches the database for partial matches or whether such matches turn up
as the result of a search because the parameters of the search permitted less than an identical match
between the sample and the DNA profile. See id. at 299.
114. Id. at 297–98.
115. See id. at 296. In 2008, California became the first state to formally authorize intentional
partial matches, or “familial” searches. Id. at 293.
116. Matching STRs on the Y chromosomes, in addition to a partial match on the CODIS loci,
can show how closely related two men are through their male ancestors. This Y-STR typing can
show whether two men share the same genetic father or paternal grandfather. See, e.g., Michael
Chamberlain, Familial DNA Searching: A Proponent’s Perspective, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2012, at
18, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_
magazine/sp12_dna_search_proponents.authcheckdam.pdf (explaining basics of California familial
match policy).
117. See supra Part I.
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attention to racial and ethnic minorities who may be unfairly targeted for
genetic surveillance. 118 Yet if we think of familial searches as big data
problems, we might also make some useful connections to other areas in
which data is being amassed in large quantities for one purpose and later
used for another. For instance, policies on familial searches might follow
principles of informational privacy used in other database contexts,
including limited later analysis to the specific original purpose for which
the information was collected. 119
This potential for repurposing is not limited to familial searches of
CODIS, either. A profile in the national DNA database is a string of
numbers referring to the thirteen STR locations. 120 Most courts
analyzing Fourth Amendment challenges to the compulsory collection of
DNA have focused only on the DNA profile to deny that their collection
and storage by the government raises serious privacy concerns. 121 What
is often ignored, however, is that these numbers are generated from
biological samples. 122 These samples pose rich data possibilities;
information that could be analyzed in different ways for a variety of
purposes. 123 Indeed, David Lazer and Viktor Mayer-Schönberger argue
118. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 113, at 304 (“Familial searches should be forbidden because
they embody the very presumptions that our constitutional and evidentiary rules have long
endeavored to counteract: guilt by association, racial discrimination, propensity, and even biological
determinism. They are akin to adopting a policy to collect and store the DNA of otherwise databaseineligible persons, solely because they share a blood relation with a convicted person . . . .”); Sonia
M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and DNA Familial Searching, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 309,
368–70 (2010).
119. See, e.g., David Lazer & Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Statutory Frameworks for Regulating
Information Flows: Drawing Lessons for the DNA Data Banks from Other Government Data
Systems, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 366, 372 (2006).
120. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 100 (describing CODIS profile as “numerical sequence”).
121. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013) (observing that “the
CODIS loci come from noncoding parts of the DNA that do not reveal the genetic traits of the
arrestee”).
122. See, e.g., Suter, supra note 118, at 331 (“Courts often minimize or fail to address the fact
that the collection of DNA samples involves two privacy intrusions: the actual collection of
biological samples and the retention of samples that contain one’s genetic information.”).
123. Scholars and judges have expressed a wide range of opinions on whether privacy interests
are truly threatened by DNA samples held by the government. Compare N. Van Camp & K.
Dierickx, The Retention of Forensic DNA Samples: A Socio-Ethical Evaluation of Current Practices
in the EU, 34 J. MED. ETHICS 606, 606 (2008), and Tania Simoncelli & Barry Steinhardt,
California’s Proposition 69: A Dangerous Precedent for Criminal DNA Databases, 33 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 279, 284 (2005) (“While law enforcement authorities would like us to believe that the
samples will never be used for anything besides catching criminals, an unlimited span of improper
uses remain plausible so long as those samples are retained.”), and Suter, supra note 118, at 335
(“[W]e should be wary of [sample retention] given its substantial threat to privacy and civil
liberties.”), with David H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory for Arrestee DNA and Other
Biometric Databases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1095, 1155–58 (2013) (expressing extreme skepticism
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that the very existence of these DNA samples “invites re-purposing at a
later stage.” 124
At the moment, however, practical and legal barriers bar this
possibility. 125 Although state laws vary with regard to storage, retention,
and disclosure requirements, 126 federal law imposes conditions on those
samples used to generate profiles for CODIS. For instance, federal law
requires that all samples used for CODIS profiles are subject to
disclosure only to “criminal justice agencies for law enforcement
identification purposes,” “in judicial proceedings,” “for criminal defense
purposes,” and for a “population statistics database, identification
research and protocol development purposes, or for quality control
purposes.” 127 At the same time, most state laws contemplate indefinite
retention of most DNA samples. 128 Justifications for indefinite DNA
sample retention include the need to identify potential sample
contamination or mix-ups, to implement changes in the technology used
to analyze samples, and to provide lab quality assurance. 129
that DNA samples will ever be used beyond biometric identification).
124. Lazer & Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 119, at 372 (emphasis added); see also Lawless,
supra note 100 (quoting one supporter of genetic databases as acknowledging “[t]here is an
argument to be made that because that biological sample exists, the government could go back and
do other things with it that are not authorized by the law”).
125. These legal barriers, however, do not apply to the emerging issue of “offline” or “rogue”
DNA databases that are being established by local law enforcement agencies that have no intention
of sharing the information with CODIS. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Police Agencies Are
Assembling Records of DNA, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2013, at A1 (“These local databases operate
under their own rules, providing the police much more leeway than state and federal regulations.”).
126. See, e.g., Sarah B. Berson, Debating DNA Collection, NAT’L INST. JUST. J., Nov. 2009, at 9,
11, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/228383.pdf (“State laws . . . vary with regard to
how samples may be used beyond law enforcement and quality control purposes.”).
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(3) (2006). Some have suggested, however, that a “criminal justice
purpose” could be broadly construed to permit law enforcement agencies to analyze samples for a
variety of purposes beyond simple matches to crime scene evidence. See, e.g., Suter, supra note
118, at 336.
128. See, e.g., JAMES, supra note 103, at 5; Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, The
Expanding Use of DNA in Law Enforcement: What Role for Privacy?, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 153,
158 (2006) (“There is no national policy on sample retention, but in almost every state the samples
are retained indefinitely.”). Many of these observations have relied upon a 2005 study by the
American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics. See SETH AXELRAD, AM. SOC’Y OF L., MED. &
ETHICS, SURVEY OF STATE DNA DATABASE STATUTES, http://www.aslme.org/dna_04/grid/
guide.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
129. M. Dawn Herkenham, Retention of Offender DNA Samples Necessary to Ensure and
Monitor Quality of Forensic DNA Efforts: Appropriate Safeguards Exist to Protect the DNA
Samples from Misuse, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 380, 381–82 (2006) (Herkenham was the chief of the
FBI unit responsible for implementing the NDIS); see also JOHN M. BUTLER, FUNDAMENTALS OF
FORENSIC DNA TYPING 280–81 (2009) (noting that samples should be preserved for quality control
and for “technology advancements in the future” regarding new genetic markers or assays).
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For the now, practical barriers also bar comprehensive analysis of the
millions of samples collected for criminal justice purposes. While human
genome sequencing is vastly cheaper today than it was a few years ago,
it likely remains prohibitively costly for states to undertake on a massive
scale. 130 These practical and legal impediments may, however, change
one day. As technological capabilities change, costs decrease, and a
greater understanding of genetic information emerges, the use of DNA
databases will raise serious questions for lawmakers about the
appropriate balance of big data analysis and privacy protections. 131
III. HOW BIG DATA CHALLENGES FOURTH AMENDMENT
ANALYSIS
These evolving areas raise new questions about how best to regulate
the use of big data by the police. In particular, they arise from three
characteristics of big data: the use of artificial intelligence, the scale of
data storage, and the repurposing of collected data. This section
considers some of the difficult questions that judges and lawmakers will
face.
A.

Human Judgment and Police Suspicion

While popular accounts misleadingly suggest that predictive policing
involves police decision-making controlled by computers, 132 even partial
reliance on artificial intelligence does raise important Fourth
Amendment questions. Police are using predictive policing software to
direct them to places where they believe there is a high likelihood of
criminal activity. Having been directed there by computer analysis, the
police must then determine whether any persons located there warrant
further investigation. What role should artificial intelligence and human
judgment play in Fourth Amendment individualized suspicion?
At a minimum, ordinary investigative detentions by the police require
130. In the years since the human genome was first sequenced, the cost of sequencing has fallen
dramatically, from nearly $100 million in 2001 to less than $6,000 in 2013. The National Human
Genome Research Institute tracks the costs of genome sequencing. See K.A. Wetterstrand, DNA
Sequencing Costs: Data from the NHGRI Genome Sequencing Program (GSP), NAT’L HUMAN
GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/sequencingcosts/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
131. See, e.g., Phil Reilly, Legal and Public Policy Issues in DNA Forensics, 2 NATURE REVIEWS
GENETICS 313, 317 (2001) (suggesting establishment of “a permanent commission to oversee [DNA
databanks], which could review and monitor all requests to use samples for purposes other than
forensic identification”).
132. See, e.g., PERRY ET AL., supra note 51, at 115–16 (“Although much of news coverage
promotes the meme that predictive policing is a crystal ball, these algorithms simply predict risks.”).
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reasonable suspicion 133 based on a totality of the circumstances.134 The
Supreme Court’s decisions have permitted the police to formulate
reasonable suspicion based not only on their own personal observations,
but also on other information, including fellow officers, 135 tips (even
anonymous ones), 136 and sometimes even on determinations that
particular geographic locations may be labeled as “high crime areas.” 137
In particular, tips relied upon by the police must be sufficiently
particularized to an individual, in some part predictive of future activity,
and corroborated by the observation of the police themselves. 138
The question here is whether predictive software based on historical
crime data is similar to other uses of third party information that have
already been held to support a reasonable suspicion determination. 139
Imagine that such software directs the police to a city block to look for
property crime, and they observe activity that by itself may not appear
obviously suspicious, such as carrying a duffel bag, or peering in
windows. 140 A probabilistic determination is not exactly like an
informant’s tip, particularly since predictive software provides
assessments about geographic areas and not persons. 141 Nevertheless, a
133. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968).
134. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (“Reasonable suspicion . . . is dependent upon
both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Both factors—
quantity and quality—are considered in the ‘totality of the circumstances—the whole picture’ that
must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.” (citation
omitted)).
135. Cf. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111 (1965) (“Observations of fellow officers
of the Government engaged in a common investigation are plainly a reliable basis for a warrant
applied for by one of their number.”).
136. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244–46 (1983).
137. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
138. See, e.g., Gates, 462 U.S. at 245–46 (noting that anonymous tip “contained a range of details
relating . . . to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted”); Florida v. J.L., 529
U.S. 266, 271 (2000) (noting that the tip in the case “provided no predictive information and
therefore left the police without means to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility”); 2 WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 3.3f (5th ed. 2012) (“[I]t seems wise in light of subsequent events
to read Gates to mean that corroboration of part of an anonymous informant’s information will
constitute a sufficient substitute for directly-established veracity and basis of knowledge only if the
corroborated events are in and of themselves quite suspicious.”).
139. Professor Andrew Ferguson was among the first to recognize the Fourth Amendment
challenges raised by the adoption of predictive policing programs. See Ferguson, supra note 58, at
305–12 (discussing these analogies).
140. See id. at 309 (citing example).
141. Because such programs only make predictions about areas where crime is likely to happen, it
would seem more difficult to justify probable cause in the predictive policing analysis, although
certainly many stops can ripen into full blown arrests once more information about the suspect is
made known to the police during the course of a stop.
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court might analogize computerized predictions to informant-based
predictions about specific places—such as drug houses and hourly
motels—to add to the reasonable suspicion assessment.142 While likely
not sufficient on its own to provide justification for a stop (because of its
lack of specificity with regard to persons), such predictions could form
the basis of police observation and corroboration. 143
So long as predictive software is not the sole justification used by
police, courts are likely to accept its place within the reasonable
suspicion analysis. If, for instance, courts were to borrow assessments of
credibility and veracity from the informant context, 144 predictive
software may provide more justification than an anonymous informant.
The assumptions and inputs of such software, after all, are capable of
verification. 145 Indeed, to the extent that the Supreme Court has
emphasized that the reasonable suspicion determination is to be
objective, 146 reliance on a computer analysis of crime data is arguably
more objective than an inference made by an officer or a tip provided by
a third party. Software with a demonstrated history of successfully
predicting high crime areas based on verifiable crime data is likely to be
a highly persuasive factor in the reasonable suspicion formulation.
Indeed, predictive software may remove some of the problems raised
by the types of information used. Informants, particularly anonymous
ones, can have questionable motivations in aiding the police. 147 In
142. See Ferguson, supra note 58, at 306–07.
143. See id. at 310 (observing that “a common theme in the Fourth Amendment” analysis of
reasonable suspicion is “[c]orroboration of individual actions”).
144. While the Court in Illinois v. Gates adopted a totality of the circumstances tests for probable
cause, it nevertheless reaffirmed that these factors continued to be “all highly relevant” and “should
be understood [to] illuminate the commonsense, practical question” of probable cause. See 462 U.S.
213, 230 (1983). The same can be said of the reasonable suspicion standard as well. See Alabama v.
White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable
cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is
different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense
that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show
probable cause.”).
145. Cf. Ferguson, supra note 58, at 307 (noting that “an objective, well-functioning computer
program seems more reliable than your typical police informant”).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981) (“[In an investigative
detention] officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
person stopped of criminal activity.”).
147. The tip that led to the investigation of Lance and Sue Gates was allegedly given by Sue
Gates’s hairdresser, annoyed with Sue’s boasting. Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth
and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment ‘Search and Seizure’
Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 933, 1005 n.383 (2010). On the problems raised by the
“informant institution,” see generally Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and
Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645 (2004).
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addition, most courts are highly deferential to generalized police
judgments of what constitutes a “high-crime area.” 148 Software that
eliminates undesirable biases and requires quantitative precision can
introduce more fairness into the police decision-making process. 149
Some caveats remain, however. First, no predictive policing program
is entirely objective. The basic building blocks of a predictive software
program necessarily involve human discretion. 150 The assumptions
underlying any method of crime prediction rely upon the decision to
choose one model of risk prediction over another. The data used to build
the models will depend on discretionary judgments about the types of
crimes used for prediction, and the type of information used to predict
those crimes. Should a police department focus on burglaries; and if so,
how are burglaries to be measured? For example, reliance on arrest rates
is surely problematic 151 because arrests themselves are discretionary
decisions that, if used as the basis to justify more attention, may simply
reinforce unjustified police stereotypes that certain neighborhoods need
heavier police attention. 152
Second, prediction models might nudge police judgments in favor of
investigative detention in borderline cases because the police rely too

148. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area”
Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable
Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1607 (2008) (“[T]he majority of jurisdictions . . . have
relied on an officer’s testimony that an area is a ‘high-crime area’ without much analysis as to the
basis of that conclusion.”).
149. I have argued elsewhere that an automated traffic enforcement system made possible by a
federal intelligent highway initiative could improve fairness and reduce or eliminate racial profiling
in traffic stops. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing: Technology and the Fourth
Amendment, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 199 (2007).
150. Not only are there decisions about which model to use, each model itself involves
discretionary judgments about the type and amount of data to use, as well as how to display it. See,
e.g., BACHNER, supra note 48, at 21 (“Just as with the other clustering methods, the final map is
sensitive to analyst judgment.”).
151. Measures of crime based on arrest rates—and particularly arrests in minor offenses—are
problematic because they represent the greatest exercise of police discretion. See Wayne A. Logan,
Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1590 (2012). As a result, the resulting data may often
reflect racial biases in policing. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Fingerprint Identification and the
Criminal Justice System: Historical Lessons for the DNA Debate, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 63, 82 (David Lazer ed., 2004) (observing that
criminal histories “appear to be pure, objective information, when in fact they may reflect the
prejudices of police or judicial practitioners”).
152. See, e.g., Predictive Policing: Don’t Even Think About It, ECONOMIST (July 20, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21582042-it-getting-easier-foresee-wrongdoing-and-spotlikely-wrongdoers-dont-even-think-about-it (“It matters . . . whether software crunches reports of
crimes or arrests; if the latter, police activity risks creating a vicious circle.”).
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heavily on probabilistic information. 153 If, for example, a predictive
model directs the police to look at a particular block for burglaries, then
it may encourage the police to “see” suspicious behavior when there
may be none. 154 The danger here is that an overreliance on the
objectivity of prediction—which is in fact an informed probabilistic
guess—will be determinative, rather than a supplement to independent
assessments by the police.
B.

Privacy and Surveillance Big Data

What we do in public can be seen by anyone and therefore we
generally cannot claim those activities are private. That intuition is
embodied in the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test to determine
whether the Fourth Amendment applies to police activity at all.155 But
does assuming the risk of police surveillance mean something different
when the police have mass surveillance capabilities?
Computer enhanced mass surveillance systems would seem to be the
latest example of the increasing sophistication of police technologies to
monitor public activity. Decades of police reliance upon CCTV cameras,
electronic beepers, listening devices, surveillance aircraft, and other
similar sense enhancements have prompted concerns that these measures
have significantly eroded any social sense of privacy individuals have in
public. 156 Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized in a number of
cases that our public activities, movements, and even our literal physical
characteristics visible to the public lack Fourth Amendment
protection. 157
153. The predictive software may drive the officer to use personal observation to confirm the
potentially suspicious behavior rather than independently assess whether it is truly suspicious. Cf.
Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to, and Opportunities for, Police
Getting the Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 29–30 (2010)
(discussing “continuum model” in which observer uses further assessment to confirm initial
judgments rather than challenging them).
154. A court may see the issue characterized as a kind of reliable tip—albeit from a computer—
that requires less police corroboration precisely because of its reliability. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra
note 58, at 308 (making this observation).
155. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
156. In fact, the problems of a mass surveillance system like the total domain awareness program
were anticipated years before such programs actually existed. See, e.g., Robert H. Thornburg,
Comment, Face Recognition Technology: The Potential Orwellian Implications and
Constitutionality of Current Uses Under the Fourth Amendment, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 321, 343 (2002) (noting in 2002 that “a networked system could identify an individual in
one location on a specific date, and identify that same person at a different location afterwards”).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (“The physical characteristics of a
person’s voice, its tone and manner, as opposed to the content of a specific conversation, are

07 - Joh Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

60

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

3/26/2014 2:48 PM

[Vol. 89:35

Moreover, a line of Supreme Court cases suggests that any “scientific
enhancement” of the senses used by the police to watch activity falls
outside of the Fourth Amendment’s protections if the activity takes place
in public. 158 Thus, the Supreme Court concluded in United States v.
Knotts that police use of an electronic beeper to follow a suspect
surreptitiously did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. 159 The
premise underlying such a conclusion is that if the police could
themselves pursue a suspect over the same public roads, then so too
could an electronic beeper concealed within a container given to the
unwitting suspect. 160
The surveillance capacities of the police today, however, far exceed
even what armies of police officers could accomplish without access to
big data. 161 That difference should alter the absence of Fourth
Amendment protections. Indeed, several Justices have recently indicated
concerns about the big data surveillance capacities of the police.162 For
example, in United States v. Jones 163 (regarding the twenty-eight day
GPS tracking of a single suspect 164), five Justices expressed concerns
that long-term police surveillance, even of a person’s public movements,
might constitute a Fourth Amendment search. 165 The premise here,
sometimes referred to as the “mosaic theory,” is that the danger to
Fourth Amendment privacy lies in the aggregation of discrete bits of
data, even if each piece standing alone would not be subjected to
constitutional protections. 166 Indeed, the majority in Knotts
constantly exposed to the public. . . . No person can have a reasonable expectation that others will
not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect that his face will be a
mystery to the world.”); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (“Fingerprinting involves
none of the probing into an individual’s private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or
search.”). Christopher Slobogin has convincingly argued, however, that a right to anonymity—even
in public—should be protected by the Fourth Amendment. See Christopher Slobogin, Public
Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213
(2002).
158. E.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
159. Id.
160. Id. (“A police car following [the defendant] at a distance throughout his journey could have
observed him leaving the public highway and arriving at the cabin owned by respondent, with the
drum of chloroform still in the car.”).
161. See, e.g., People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) (“The potential for a
similar capture [to GPS technology] of information or ‘seeing’ by law enforcement would require,
at a minimum, millions of additional police officers and cameras on every street lamp.”).
162. Certainly a number of lower court judges have expressed these concerns as well.
163. __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
164. Id. at 948.
165. See id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
166. The “mosaic theory” is generally attributed to the decision in United States v. Maynard, 615
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acknowledged that “dragnet-type law enforcement practices,” such as
“twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country,” might
raise a Fourth Amendment problem while the use of a beeper did not. 167
Not only is the quantity of information collected in the big data
context far greater, the very nature of surveillance itself is different. If
conventional surveillance involves the intentional tracking of one or a
few suspects by actual police officers, what happens when a person
“emerges” as a surveillance target as a result of a computer analysis? In
the traditional surveillance context, the police have not been constrained
by the Fourth Amendment so long as their investigations neither
interfered with an individual’s movements, nor ranged beyond public
spaces. 168 As the Supreme Court has observed, there is no constitutional
right to be free from police investigation. 169
But this surveillance discretion may mean something different in the
big data context. The intentional surveillance of targeted individuals is
not equivalent to the perpetual “indiscriminate data collection” 170 of
entire populations. While both approaches involve watching by the
government, a program like the N.Y.P.D.’s “total domain awareness”
system differs from traditional surveillance enough to warrant a different
approach. 171 The very quality of public life may be different when
government watches everyone—surreptitiously—and stores all of the
resulting information. 172
F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed
by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he
does ensemble. These types of information can each reveal more about a person than does any
individual trip viewed in isolation.”). See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 326 (2012) (“[F]ive justices wrote or joined opinions
that . . . suggest that a majority of the Court is ready to embrace some form of the D.C. Circuit’s
mosaic theory.”).
167. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283–85 (1983).
168. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (“Obviously, not all personal intercourse
between policemen and citizens involves ‘seizures’ of persons. Only when the officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we
conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.”).
169. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 576 (1988) (“The police [are] not required to have ‘a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting [respondent] of criminal activity,’ in order to
pursue him.” (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981))); cf. Oyler v. Boles,
368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (“[T]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in [law] enforcement is not
in itself a federal constitutional violation.”).
170. Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH.
& POL’Y 281, 286.
171. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 138, § 2.7(g) (raising similar concerns).
172. See United States v. Jones, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms.”).
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Practical barriers have long served to protect individual privacy by
forcing the police to selectively apply their resources and interests, 173 but
those barriers have now largely eroded. 174 The ability of government to
record, store, and analyze nearly everything we do is now becoming
technologically possible and affordable. 175 By 2015, it will cost just two
cents to store all of the audio data generated by the average person in
one year; storing a year’s worth of a person’s movements generated by
their cellphone will cost next to nothing. 176 These expanded capabilities
raise the possibility of a “surveillance time machine”: the capacity of the
government to identify a person of interest and then search
retrospectively through all of the data that has been stored and collected
about that person. 177 While some people have already changed their
personal habits to avoid this mass surveillance, many likely have not. 178
The longstanding doctrines declaring that we lack any Fourth
Amendment protections in the public sphere should not hold its
traditional force once the police deploy the tools of big data. 179
“Knowing exposure” suggests a degree of control over one’s
information that is lacking when the government is capable of recording
and storing every small detail in perpetuity. 180 Thus the traditional
assumptions about Fourth Amendment protections in public spaces,
173. See, e.g., id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (“In the pre-computer age, the
greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical. Traditional
surveillance for any extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely
undertaken.”).
174. See Scott Shane, Data Storage Could Expand Reach of Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14,
2012), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/14/advances-in-data-storage-have-implicationsfor-government-surveillance/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See VILLASENOR, supra note 22, at 1. Wayne Logan has persuasively argued that such a
capacity has exposed the need to distinguish between identity evidence used strictly for identity
verification and that used for forensic investigation. See Logan, supra note 151, at 1581–93.
178. On the various ways in which people might protest the growing surveillance capacities of
the government, see Elizabeth E. Joh, Privacy Protests: Surveillance Evasion and Fourth
Amendment Suspicion, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 997 (2013); see also VILLASENOR, supra note 22, at 7
(observing that the use of encryption, for instance, might attract greater government attention).
179. Kevin Bankston and Ashkan Soltani have demonstrated the enormous differences in cost
between traditional and new surveillance methods. They estimate that the cost of a using a
traditional covert five police car surveillance operation over 28 days—the days the government
followed Antoine Jones—is “nearly 775 times more expensive than the cost of using GPS.” Kevin S.
Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the Cost of Surveillance: Making Cents out of
United States v. Jones, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 334, 335 (2014), http://yalelawjournal.org/2014/1/9/
bankston-soltani.html.
180. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”).
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absent statutory protections from Congress, call out for reexamination
and doctrinal adaptation.
C.

Repurposing Information

Google’s reuse of search terms to identify flu outbreaks represents an
upending of a core research convention: formulate a hypothesis first, and
then collect the appropriate data.181 With big data, we can collect (nearly
all) the data first, and apply the questions later. 182 Indeed, the data can be
analyzed in multiple ways at multiple times. 183 It is this repurposing or
resifting of data that has led to some of big data’s unexpected insights,
like Google’s flu analysis.
When it is the police who sift through the data, however, the Fourth
Amendment is ill-suited to this particular relationship of data collection
and analysis. The Fourth Amendment is primarily interested in the
legitimacy of how information is acquired. 184 If the acquisition is
permissible, how the police use that information thereafter is generally
not subject to an additional Fourth Amendment challenge. 185 This
suggests that once legitimately within the government’s possession,
information can be repurposed and reanalyzed without any additional
Fourth Amendment justification. 186 In the case of genetic information,
courts have been generally dismissive of claims that individuals have
any Fourth Amendment claims to DNA samples once lawfully acquired

181. See supra text accompanying notes 43–47.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 43–47.
183. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 10, at 104 (“In the big-data age, data is
like a magical diamond mine that keeps on giving long after its principal value has been tapped.”).
184. See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, Pervasive Surveillance and the Future of the Fourth
Amendment, 80 MISS. L.J. 1289, 1294–95 (2011) (“Fourth Amendment law . . . has proved
singularly inept at dealing with the technological revolution. . . . [This is because it] has purported to
regulate and control the non-consensual governmental acquisition of information from individuals
in the name of privacy protection.”).
185. See Erin Murphy, Back to the Future: The Curious Case of United States v. Jones, 10 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 325, 330–31 (2012) (“Current Fourth Amendment law emphasizes acquisition: how
did the police acquire the DNA sample or financial record or biometric image? It cares little for
what happens next—to what use that information is put.”).
186. Thus in a case from the 1990s, the New York Court of Appeals rejected a Fourth
Amendment challenge to the use of a DNA analysis to connect a defendant to a rape, although the
warrant for the blood sample was approved with regard to a different case. People v. King, 663
N.Y.S.2d 610, 614 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (“It is also clear that once a person’s blood sample has
been obtained lawfully, he can no longer assert either privacy claims or unreasonable search and
seizure arguments with respect to the use of that sample. Privacy concerns are no longer relevant
once the sample has already lawfully been removed from the body, and the scientific analysis of a
sample does not involve any further search and seizure of a defendant’s person.”).
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by the police, but used for investigative purposes unrelated to the
original justification for the sample’s collection. 187
Is a secondary analysis of an individual’s DNA sample to find a
familial match sufficiently similar to an analysis to find whether that
same individual is responsible for another crime? Are there other sorts of
information to be derived from DNA samples that ought to require
distinct Fourth Amendment justifications? Repurposing a DNA sample
to look for information regarding someone other than the source of the
sample raises sufficient privacy concerns that some further government
justifications may be necessary. 188 Such a search does more than
“identify” again the source of the DNA sample in a subsequent police
investigation. 189
The government’s ability to reanalyze information—of any sort—in
the age of big data calls out for a new approach. What courts could do is
shift the focus of the Fourth Amendment from data collection to a more
rigorous scrutiny of its intended uses by the government. 190 Indeed,
Harold Krent proposed nearly twenty years ago that the repurposing of
information by the government obtained at an earlier time could be
deemed unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. 191 Professor
Krent suggested, for instance, that courts might consider whether the
seizure of a person’s information would have been reasonable had the
government articulated the later use initially. 192 The closer the
187. See, e.g., State v. Hauge, 79 P.3d 131, 144 (Haw. 2003) (“[T]he appellate courts of several
states have ruled that expectations of privacy in lawfully obtained blood samples . . . are not
objectively reasonable by ‘society’s’ standards. Specifically, a number of jurisdictions have held on
analogous facts that once a blood sample and DNA profile is lawfully procured from a defendant,
no privacy interest persists in either the sample or the profile.”); State v. Emerson, 981 N.E.2d 787,
792–93 (Ohio 2012) (rejecting defendant’s claims of privacy in subsequent uses of DNA profile);
Smith v. State, 734 N.E.2d 706, 710 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“[L]aw enforcement agencies may retain
validly obtained DNA samples for use in subsequent unrelated criminal investigations . . . .”), aff’d,
744 N.E.2d 437 (Ind. 2001).
188. Kelly Lowenberg argues that subsequent searches of DNA samples that yield new
information should require further government justification and a consideration of the
reasonableness of that additional search. In the familial search context, Lowenberg suggests that YSTR typing of a DNA sample of a convicted offender would be permissible without a warrant,
while the same analysis conducted on another type of sample (e.g. a volunteer sample) would not.
See Kelly Lowenberg, Applying the Fourth Amendment When DNA Collected for One Purpose is
Tested for Another, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1289, 1319–23 (2011).
189. Cf. Logan, supra note 151, at 1586 (distinguishing evidence showing “one’s identity (who
one is), [from the] entirely different question . . . presented by identifying information (revealing
what one might have done or perhaps will do”) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)).
190. See Covey, supra note 184, at 1302.
191. Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth
Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 60–63 (1995).
192. See id. at 80–81.
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government’s secondary purpose is to its original purpose at the time of
acquisition, the more likely it should be that the government could use
the data without further justification.
The case for Fourth Amendment protections regarding repurposed
information is stronger still should the government one day be interested
in gleaning information from DNA samples other than matching profiles
to crime scene samples. Here, the Supreme Court has hinted at a
willingness to reassess the balance of privacy and government utility at
some future date. In Maryland v. King, 193 in which the Court upheld the
compulsory collection of DNA from arrestees, 194 Justice Kennedy
suggested that “[i]f in the future police analyze [DNA] samples to
determine [other information], that case would present additional
privacy concerns not present here.” 195 The resolution by the Court
regarding such a dispute may well turn, however, on the purposes
claimed by the government to mine that information. In King, the Court
was willing to permit defendant’s cheek swab, and the subsequently
generated DNA profile, without individualized suspicion because the
police were permitted to find out King’s “identity”: a term broad enough
to encompass any other crimes King had committed. 196
For now, however, the Court has left open the possibility that it may
give greater scrutiny to some sorts of repurposing. That, plus the existing
statutory protections on access and disclosure, may allay the concerns of
many. 197 Yet it would be overly optimistic to ignore two developments
in the other direction: the trend of Fourth Amendment law away from
protection in these secondary searches, and the Court’s recent expansion
of what the government may do for purposes of “identification” when it
comes to genetic information. 198

193. __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
194. Id. at 1980.
195. Id. at 1979.
196. Id. at 1980. Justice Scalia’s dissent in King was much less sanguine about the threats to
privacy in the case, and strongly disputed that the government’s interest in the case could be
justified as one of “identification.” See id. at 1988 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting “it may one day be
possible to design a program that uses DNA for a purpose other than crime-solving”).
197. Cf. United States v. Jones, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in
judgment) (“A legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed
lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”).
198. In the King case, the majority comfortably found that arrestee DNA profiles could be used to
link the defendant to a crime unrelated to the crime of arrest, King, 133 S. Ct. at 1965, 1970–80, a
definition of “identification” to which Justice Scalia dissented, dramatically. See id. at 1982–90
(Scalia, J., dissenting). For further discussion of this issue, see Joh, supra note 111.
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Beyond the Fourth Amendment

Apart from the Fourth Amendment challenges raised by big data
policing, an uncritical embrace of these new technologies raises other
concerns beyond regulating the police. Whether practical or abstract,
these concerns will be easily swept aside by departments eager to be part
of the next technological wave in policing.
First, many of these new technologies have been developed by private
companies whose motivations and concerns may not always be
consonant with those of a public police department. For instance, IBM
has spent billions acquiring data analytics companies in order to develop
and market predictive tools to the police.199 Although PredPol was
initially developed by academics, it is now a for-profit company. 200
Similarly, Microsoft—and the N.Y.P.D.—will profit from every new
police department that adopts a total domain awareness system. 201 Future
interest in the further analysis of DNA samples will also benefit some
private laboratories.
Second, the introduction of new big data technologies requires
attention not only to appropriate regulation, but also to questions about
how well these privately developed tools actually help to reduce crime.
New technologies possess understandable appeal for departments
seeking innovative crime fighting strategies. New strategies lend
themselves toward positive media attention in a way that “a poorly
attended community meeting in a church basement” does not. 202 Yet,
for-profit purveyors of big data products may not provide the best
objective assessment of their products. The desirability of these new
technologies should not steer attention away from questions about how
well they reduce crime and conserve limited public resources compared
to traditional methods.
A final concern is much more fundamental. The reliance on big data
199. See Sengupta, supra note 5. Indeed, to the extent that these companies may market both to
public police departments and private corporations interested in reducing crime privately, special
attention must be paid to claims of public benefit. For further discussion on how private interests
can distort public police goals, see Elizabeth E. Joh, The Forgotten Threat: Private Policing and the
State, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 357, 384–88 (2006).
200. See, e.g., Bond-Graham & Winston, supra note 64 (noting that PredPol incorporated in
January 2012 and “has emerged early to dominate the [predictive policing] market”).
201. The N.Y.P.D. is said to receive thirty percent of gross revenues from sales of the system to
other departments. Sam Roberts, Police Surveillance May Earn Money for City, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4,
2013, at A23.
202. David Alan Sklansky, The Persistent Pull of Police Professionalism, NEW PERSPECTIVES IN
POLICING (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Cambridge, Mass. & Nat’l Inst. of Just.), Mar. 2011, at 9,
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/232676.pdf.
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by the police also poses the risk that the very definition of policing may
be changing. The promise of big data is a vision of policing that is
driven and assessed by quantitative measurements. Indeed, those police
chiefs that have already embraced big data tout the potential to rely on
numbers when budgets for police departments are shrinking. 203 The
problem, however, is that a technocratic solution to crime is not the only
objective of democratic policing. 204
Reducing crime is not the only job of the police. Policing as an
institution has never been amenable to a single objective, 205 and indeed
over time its aims have shifted. 206 What is clear, however, is that
democratic policing aims at more than mere crime control and, at its
core, relies on skills that do not always lend themselves to statistical
analysis. No amount of data-driven policing is likely to assuage
communities soured by long histories of tension with the police. Nor
will demonstrations of little red boxes on a smartphone necessarily
justify to a community the need for a heavy-handed police presence.
CONCLUSION
The use of big data is likely to become an ordinary aspect of policing.
The application of artificial intelligence to crime data promises
immediate and tangible benefits. We can gain some real insights about
how to direct police resources efficiently and effectively in ways that
intuition, tradition, and limited information have been unavailing. At the
same time, the reliance upon artificial intelligence and the collection of
vast amounts of information poses some special challenges in the
policing context. Courts and legislatures will need to think of Fourth
203. See, e.g., Charlie Beck & Colleen McCue, Predictive Policing: What Can We Learn from
Wal-Mart and Amazon about Fighting Crime in a Recession?, POLICE CHIEF (Nov. 2009),
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=194
2&issue_id=112009 (arguing that “predictive policing represents an opportunity to prevent crime
and respond more effectively, while optimizing increasingly scarce or limited resources, including
personnel”) (Charlie Beck is the Chief of Detectives for the L.A.P.D.).
204. Cf. Sklansky, supra note 202, at 9–10 (“A fixation on technology can distract attention from
the harder and more important parts of [policing], the parts that rely on imagination and
judgment.”).
205. Perhaps the ambiguities of policing was best stated by sociologist Egon Bittner, who
described the job of policing as: “a mechanism for the distribution of non-negotiably coercive force
employed in accordance with the dictates of an intuitive grasp of situational exigencies.” See EGON
BITTNER, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE POLICE IN MODERN SOCIETY: A REVIEW OF BACKGROUND
FACTORS, CURRENT PRACTICES, AND POSSIBLE ROLE MODELS 46 (1970).
206. See, e.g., Eric H. Monkkonen, History of Urban Police, 15 CRIME & JUST. 547, 555 (1992)
(observing that early in American policing history the police were expected to dole out social
services to the city’s needy).

07 - Joh Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

68

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

3/26/2014 2:48 PM

[Vol. 89:35

Amendment issues in new ways to adequately protect notions of
individual privacy.

